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Book Review
A PERILOUS IMBALANCE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
CANADIAN LAW AND GOVERNANCE, by Stephen Clarkson
and Stepan Wood'
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN 2
WE OWE A GREAT DEBT to the now defunct Law Commission of Canada for
having brought Stephen Clarkson and Stepan Wood together as virtual scholars-
in-residence. The unlikely duo of Clarkson, who has done path-breaking work
on the political economy of continental integration, and Wood, who is one of
Canada's leading scholars of international environmental law, have joined forces to
produce a comprehensive account of Canada's entanglement with globalization's
legal rules and institutions (what I call herein transnational legality). Their
project is to map out the imbalance in Canada's transnational legal commitments
that favour the logic of economic rationality (in part 1) and to offer a path to
rebalancing the global legal terrain in favour of non-economic rationalities having
to do with such things as the environment, labour, and human rights (in part 2).
The state has a role to play in this project of rebalancing, but the authors appear
to prefer to keep this role to a minimum. In what follows, I turn first to the book's
main arguments and then to a discussion of two matters of particular concern.
The book opens with the observation that Canada has long been subject to
international political and economic forces,' principally originating out of the
United Kingdom and the United States. But Canada's fate has not been entirely
out of its own hands. Instead, Canada exhibits the features of a middle power: It is
both a "rule taker" and a "rule maker."' The first part of the book is taken up with
an assessment of Canada's role in the construction of the international economic
1. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 347 pages.
2. Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
3. Supra note 1 at 9.
4. Ibid at 32.
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legal order, focussing on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
and the North American Free Trade Agreement.' Regional agreements such as
these exhibit a global preference for codifying the economic interests of powerful
capital-exporting states "at the expense of human welfare and global ecological
sustainability."I This imbalance gives rise to an unevenness in how globalization
is being experienced in various locales-some places require more adjustment
(what Saskia Sassen calls "state work"8) than others.9 Lying in the semi-periphery,
the Canadian case demanded some realignment in domestic policy choices"0 and,
more significantly, subservience to the exigencies of transnational legality. This
is the consequence of Canadas new "supraconstitution." A variant of the model
of "new constitutionalism" developed by Stephen Gill," the supraconstitution is
described by Clarkson and Wood in muscular terms as having a superior legal
force that both "constrains" and "prevails over conflicting domestic laws."12
By way of illustration, the authors take up NAFTA Chapter Eleven, namely,
that part of NAFTA intended to promote and protect the interests of foreign
investors. T-hough there is much that is contentious in Chapter Eleven, the
authors focus on the prohibition on indirect expropriations that can be likened
to a regulatory takings doctrine, as it is called in the United States. To the extent
that NAFTA's takings rule represents US constitutional doctrine (it does not
do so faithfully-it goes much further than even US law would admit 3 ), it
5. 2 January 1988, Can TS 1989 No 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989, currently
. suspended).
6. 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
7. Supra note 1 at 38.
8. Territory Authority Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006) at 171,232.
9. In the Mexican case, see Stephen Clarkson, "NAFTA and the WTO in the Transformation of
Mexico's Economic System" in Joseph S Tulchin & Andrew D Selee, eds, Mexicos Politics and
Society in Transition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003) 215.
10. See Daniel P Drache, "The Mulroney-Reagan Accord: 'The Economics of Continental Power"
in Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown, eds, Trade-Offi on Free Trade: The Canada-US. Free
Trade Agreement (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 79 at 81, n 5.
11. Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
Clarkson, admittedly, has been writing about such things for quite some time independently
of Gill. See e.g. Stephen Clarkson, "Constitutionalizing the Canadian-American
Relationship" in Duncan Cameron & Mel Watkins, eds, Canada Under Free Trade
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993) 29; Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization,
Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
12. Supra note I at 55.
13. Vicki Been & Joel C Beauvais, "The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International 'Regulatory Takings' Doctrine"
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appears dissonant with the way in which property rights are recognized in both
Canadian and Mexican constitutional law. The authors go so far as to claim that
the values promoted, by the supraconstitution are "at odds with the domestic
constitutional and legal norms most valued by citizens in Canada and other liberal
democracies."' Though property rights are not subject to the same heightened
constitutional protections in Canada and Mexico, it is not clear, without further
empirical support, that in most contemporary liberal democracies, including
these two, prevailing conceptions do not attribute high value to property.15
Other elements of transnational legality-the authors examine international
environmental, health, and human security regimes, among others-are not
part of Canada's supraconstitution. Though some are legally binding, most are
considered soft law, having only reputational effects in the event of their breach."
For example, NAFTA's environmental side agreement, in contrast to NAFTA's
Chapter Eleven, is described as "toothless"1 7 and "hobbled and lame." 8 Nor are
there dispute resolution mechanisms available of the sort that produce legally
binding awards. These other elements of transnational legality do not, in short,
have the kind of primacy associated with the supraconstitution. It is for these
reasons that "[e] nvironmental lawyers often look longingly at the robust structures
of the multilateral trading system and hope to see the global environmental regime
develop in a similar manner."9 This leads to one of the constituent elements of
the authors' prescriptive account: that "governance institutions responsible for
implementing environmental, labour, and human rights agreements [be given]
powers equal to those of the institutions of global economic governance. Weak
individual rights need to be bolstered by granting them weight equivalent to the
already strong economic rights accorded to transnational business."2
The second part of the book aims to map out a means by which Canadians
and the Canadian state may repair this imbalance. First, the authors acknowledge
that the state plays an ambivalent role-it is both author of and subject to many
of the constraints of transnational legality. Nevertheless, the authors hold out
(2003) 78 NYUL Rev 30.
14. Supra note 1 at 108.
15. See e.g. the survey of property clauses in Andr6 Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses
(Cape Town: Juta & Co, 1999).
16. Supra note 1 at 130.
17. Ibidat 169.
18. Ibidat 171.
19. Ibidat 161-62.
20. Ibidat 183.
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hope that the state can exercise jurisdiction in the "service of hope"21 rather
than in "reinforce[ing] ... prevailing orthodoxies."22 Here they appear to follow
Boaventura de Sousa Santos in his hesitant embrace of the state as the "newest
social movement."23 In the current conjuncture, states play an increasingly
marginal role compared to, if not overtaken entirely by, the activities of non-state
actors. Like Santos, the authors are ambivalent about state capacity.
Private-public partnerships, privatization, and governance are some of
the terms we associate with this transfer of authority away from the state, and
it is governance that Clarkson and Wood embrace in their book. Elsewhere24
they even buy into Gunther Teubner's formulation of "global law without a
state, '25 yet they correctly concede, in tension with this formulation, that states
remain central to the structuration of transnational legality. In which case,
we can expect states to play more of a steering role in rebalancing the global
legal order. The examples they offer, however, suggest a pretty marginal role
for state actors that well complements the dominant non-state formulations
that proliferate in the global public sphere. The Forest Stewardship Council, a
global system for certification of sustainable forestry operations and products
(in chapter 7), and the New Directions Group, which formulates corporate
social responsibility (CSR) standards in the extractive industries (in chapter
8), are offered as examples of how to rebalance a global order that is out of
whack. It is instructive that both cases concern what the authors describe as
"non-state global governance"26 and "hybrid multi-stakeholder initiatives""
between business and civil society groups, where the state role is marginal or
non-existent. In the case of the New Directions Group, a role for government
is envisaged, but it is limited to offering tax credits, working with securities
regulators, and participating in a "multi-stakeholder group" to advise on
implementation and further development of the CSR framework.2 8 This is a
21. Ibidat 188.
22. Ibid at 220.
23. Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation, 2d ed (London,
UK: Reed Elsevier, 2002) at 492.
24. Supra note 1 at 61, 270.
25. "'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in Gunther Teubner, ed, Global
Law Witbouta State (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1997) 3; "Societal Constitutionalism:
Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?" in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne
Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds, Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford:
Hart, 2004) 3 [Teubner, "Societal Constitutionalism"].
26. Supra note I at 258.
27. Ibid at 259.
28. Ibid at 276-77.
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modest outcome for a project that envisages the "revitalization of the state as an
instrument of human progress."29
I now turn to two distinct concerns that arise from this book. The first
is Clarkson and Wood's appropriation of the term supraconstitution to
describe the order of priority established by transnational legality's economic
dimension. This innovation looks like a logical outgrowth of Gill's suggestive
"new constitutionalist" framework. 31 When placed in the context of the literature
regarding the constitutional features of transnational law, the phrase seems
overdrawn, if not technically inaccurate. This is not to say that constitutionalism
cannot be envisaged at levels beyond nation states, only that we should enter this
terrain with some conceptual and empirical tools readily at hand.
For instance, Neil Walker has been tracing the constitutional outlines of
the European Union project along a number of dimensions. Indicators include
the institutionalization of juridical and political-institutional orders, notions of
collective self-authorship, elements of social integration, and discursive practices
associated with constitutionalism. As applied to the European Union, Walker
finds that the EU is "registering across all five constitutional dimensions,
although in no one register do its claims go unchallenged."'" Deborah Z. Cass has
developed her own (less fluid) check list for measuring the constitutionalization
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and finds that body falls far short of
a fully constitutionalized entity.32 More recently, Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P
Trachtman have proposed a functional approach to determining those elements
of international law that have risen to the level of constitutional. 3 Their approach
generates a rather limited list of institutions that enable or constrain the production
of international law-the UN Security Council turns out to be a paradigmatic
example of international constitutional law-maker. Dunoff and Trachtman do
not include in this .list institutions that produce what they designate "ordinary"
international law (such as international trade and investment law). 34
29. Ibidat 187.
30. Gill, supra note 11.
31. "Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State" (2008) 56 Political Studies 519 at 533 [citation
omitted].
32. 7he Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
33. "A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization" in Jeffrey L Dunoff&
Joel P Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World? Constitutionalim, International Law, and Global
Governance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 3.
34. Jeffrey Dunoff& Joel Trachtman, "Ordinary and Constitutional International Law: A Response
to David Schneiderman" (14 December 2009), online: EJIL: Talk! <http://www.ejiltalk.org/
ordinary-and-constitutiona-international-aw-aresponse-to-david-schneiderman>.
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In my own work, I have undertaken an analysis of the features of international
investment law--of which NAFTA's Chapter Eleven is emblematic-in
order to identify what I describe as its "constitution-like features."35 This aids
in re-politicizing investment rules, encourages the promotion of alternative
constitutional visions, and makes more transparent the process by which
candidates for transnational legality arise out of privileged national legal sites,
such as the United States." Much of my own account is congenial with Clarkson
and Wood's, but they dispense with any qualifications, claiming that the
supraconstitution "prevails over conflicting domestic laws."37 This seems to go
further than a structural argument: that there are massive pressures emanating
from capital-exporting states and international financial institutions not to deviate
from the legal norms expressed by the supraconstitution. Instead, the authors'
claim goes so far as to maintain that transnational legality takes "precedence"
38
over domestic legal norms-a quality they call "primacy.''31 Without more, this
formulation seems out of balance. Indeed, it is a premise that would not be
tolerated by countries such as the United States.
It would have been conceptually more helpful to conceive of the system
by other formulations. Consider, for instance, James Tully's suggestive idea of
"informal paramountcy," which is meant to describe a new form of imperial legal
order that continues to operate in the aftermath of the era of decolonization.41
Tully is referring to the tradition (perfected by the British in the nineteenth
century) of "'informal' imperial rule over another people or peoples by means
of military threats and military intervention, the imposition of global markets
dominated by great powers, a dependant local governing class, and a host of
other informal techniques of indirect legal, political, educational and cultural
rule... ."4' Tully designates its contemporary variant as a form of "informal
paramountcy" where the hegemon tolerates self-rule, but by "informal
means ... induce[s] the local governments to open their resources, labour and
markets to free trade and liberalisation... ."2 Tully does not go into such detail,
35. David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and
Democracy's Promise (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) ch 1.
36. This is a process that Santos helpfully describes as "globalized localism." Supra note 23 at 179.
37. Supra note I at 55.
38. Ibidat 58.
39. Ibid at 55.
40. Public Philosopby in a New Key (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) vol 2:
Imperialism and Civic Freedom at 196, 212, 260.
41. Ibidat 132.
42. Ibid at 260.
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but a constitutional doctrine of paramountcy governed relations between the
United Kingdom and the princely states of India. 3 It gave expression to the
supervisory authority exercised by the British Empire over its dependencies in
the area of foreign relations and whenever "internal order" was threatened."
Otherwise, it generated scant legal precision in practice. When asked for
clarification, a British Parliamentary Committee in 1928 responded with the
tautology "[p]aramountcy must remain paramount."4  Contrast this with the
hardness and specificity associated with the aspects of the transnational legal
order that I have described as constitution-like. Here, the better reference point
might be Canadian constitutional law and its doctrine of federal paramountcy,
which manages jurisdictional conflict (indeed, this might have been what
Tully had in mind when he coined the term "informal paramountcy"). In the
case of constitutionally valid federal and provincial laws that are operationally
in conflict, the provincial law will yield to the federal to the extent of the
inconsistency. 6 We might think of conflicts between transnational and
national/local law in the same way but as giving rise to an informal rule or
practice rather than a strict legal rule of priority: The local will yield to the
transnational to the extent of the inconsistency because the supposed logic of
global economic rationality demands it.
There is more than conceptual clarity at stake here. To the extent that the
descriptive account is not entirely accurate, it has implications for political
strategies intended to countervail transnational economic power. According to
the alternative account I have offered here, states are not so much legally disabled
as structurally enfeebled from overcoming the strictures of transnational legality.
It might, in other words, be easier (at least legally) to resist these edicts than
might otherwise be believed.
43. Lloyd I Rudolph & Susan Hoeder Rudolph, "Rajputana Under British Paramountcy: The
Failure of Indirect Rule" (1966) 38 J Modern History 138.
44. UK, Indian Statutory Commission, The Simon Report on India: An Abridgement by RW
Brock with a foreword by Viscount Burnham (London: JM Dent & Sons, 1930) at 32
[Simon Report].
45. UK, HC, "Report of the Indian States Committee," Cmd 3302 in Sessional Papers (1928-
1929) 1 at para 57 (Harcourt Butler, Chairman). The Committee "found it impossible
to define paramountcy in a formula, and indicated that it was in the generality of the
conception that the States would find their best security for the preservation of their
independent rights in times to come" (Simon Report, supra note 44 at 30). Arthur Berriedale
Keith suggests that this definitional inquiry was precipitated by a desire on the part of Indian
rulers to have the Crown "acknowledge the right of the ruler to misgovern his state.... A
Constitutional History ofIndia, 1600-1935 (London: Methuen & Co, 1936) at 474.
46. See Bank ofMontreal v Hall, [1990] 1 SCR 121.
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The above discussion might be considered overly technical and reminiscent of
a family dispute. A second concern places in starker relief a difference of opinion,
and it concerns an element of the authors' prescriptive account. As mentioned,
Clarkson and Wood describe how environmental lawyers look longingly at
the constraints available to protect the interests of powerful economic actors.
Those constraints, and complementary supremacy, are not available to advance
the interests of those seeking to protect the environment, human rights, or
labour rights. They call, then, for rules and institutions that promote these more
neglected interests equivalent to those advancing the interests of international
economic actors. "Weak individual rights," they write-I am not certain why
these should be characterized as individual rights-"need to be bolstered by
granting them weight equivalent to the already strong economic rights accorded
to transnational business.' '47 This is not a call to dismantle structures that
institutionalize the "hard" core of the supraconstitution. Instead, it is a call for
equivalency in the powers available to these neglected domains. Whether the rise
of new institutional formations to produce hard law advancing these neglected
interests would be sufficient to countervail the power of transnational economic
governance is not discussed. There is good reason to be sceptical about this sort
of outcome In light of the widespread hand-wringing over the fragmentation
of international law 4 8-of which the transnational legal economic order is but
one feature 0-there is little reason to believe that those institutions advancing
international economic interests will absorb human rights, environmental, or
other norms within the logic of their own norm-producing enterprises.5" Rather,
this outcome likely will be determined by the weight of political power these
concurrently operating regimes will have. There is no evidence that the sum
of these individual parts will be great enough to overwhelm the ramparts of
international economic law-it is, in other words, unlikely that a countervailing
47. Supra note 1 at 183.
48. See Martti Koskenniemi & P'ivi Leino, "Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern
Anxieties" (2002) 15 Leiden J Int'l L 553.
49. See Campbell McLachlan, "Investment Treaties and General International Law" (2008) 57
ICLQ 361.
50. 'his is so, irrespective of one's views about the "cognitive openness" of these systems. On
such matters, see Teubner, "Societal Constitutionalism," supra note 25. On the "slow"
adaptation of international investment law to international human rights dimensions within
investment law, see Jorge Daniel Taillant & Jonathan Bonnitcha, "International Investment
Law and Human Rights" in Marie-Claire Cordonnier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew
Newcombe, eds, Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Alphen aan den Rijn:
Kluwer Law International, 2011) 57 at 59.
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power will materialize out of functionally disparate regimes."' It would have been
wiser for Clarkson and Wood to recommend root and branch reform, if not
repeal" 2 -that such authority be stripped down, if not done away with entirely,
and, if protections are considered necessary, 3 that they be rebuilt on entirely new
foundations.
51. For an argument along these lines, see Eyal Benvenisti & George W Downs, "The Empire's
New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law" (2007) 60
Stan L Rev 595.
52. For more detail, see Gus Van Harten et al, "Public Statement on the International
Investment Regime" (31 August 2010), online: <www.osgoode.yorku.calpublic statement/
documents/Public%20Statement.pdf>. Both Clarkson and Wood have endorsed this
statement.
53. I have responded to the claim that such constraints are necessary because they give voice to
otherwise unrepresented interests of foreign investors. See "Investing in Democracy? Political
Process and International Investment Law" (2010) 60 UTLJ 909.

